The Ignored Stories of Linamar
Linamar... Li... Na... Mar. Believe it or not this doesn't stand for Lithium, Sodium, March. It is however intended to be broken up the way I just did. The late founder, Frank Hasenfratz, needed a name so he named it after Linda, Nancy & Margret. His two daughters and his wife. I always liked that story and found it especially warming when compared to the drama of the other large Canadian auto company.
Today's post isn't about names or fun facts no matter how much they may make the company more likable. I wanted to discuss the company in a bit more detail to my prior post. Often when $LNR.TO comes up in conversation, people are unenthusiastic. On the recent financial metrics, meandering stock price, or general attitude of meh towards the industry... it get brushed off as nothing special. I get it, there are a number of stocks that trade a low multiples and most casually seem like the next. Most of the time, the low multiple is suggesting overearning, lack of growth or some type of declining business. That may or may not be the case for each. The difference in my view with Linamar is that longer term this perception is off sides. I believe they are underearning their normal or potential and with that comes the potential future realization of the quality of the business. I view the special side of the company as something that starts coming out when you break down the sides and history of the business.
Main Businesses
Auto Parts
Originally, I was going to list all the components Linamar provided within their mobility segment. I'm not going to because there are too many. If you're interested I'll give you A Link To Their Product Page. Sufficed to say, they're quite diversified across products, manufacturing methods, customers, and future flexibility. Their manufacturing assets are able to shift what they're producing and thus able to easily handle flexible order sizes & shifts. They do a lot and have since 1966. Their precision manufacturing and expertise has expanded and is likely applicable to a growing suite of products inside and outside of the auto sector.
This flexibility has allowed them to easily add substantial EV business & even FCEV/ commercial Hydrogen prospects. I mention this because I often hear stuff like "but EVs will be a threat/difficulty." I don't expect that to be the case with whichever way and timeline that plays out.
As far as earnings and EBITDA goes, this segment is the biggest contributor. It is capex & D&A heavy but when done right can more often than not be a surprisingly decent business. Even excluding the D&A it's still the largest business line.
Skyjack
Skyjack is a line of products. Have you ever seen an orange lift device? (scissor, boom, telehandler cherry picker... they have lots of names and variants) Next time you do, check if it says Skyjack on it. Linamar makes those. They're certainly not commonplace in the office for most but in places where there's physical work being done above ground level (changing a window, fixing something on the second story, etc) such devises are common. Outdoor work and warehouses frequently use them. It's a niche market for sure & there are competitors. Linamar does make a solid product with a brand that people who work in the space will recognize.
Linamar bought skyjack starting with a 48% stake in 2001. They bolstered the segment with another acquisition in 2007. It continued to grow globally and even now is expanding capacity into Mexico, Hungary and China. Some of which just started up in Q4 of 2022 and significantly expands capacity into 2023. Manufacturing will go from two plants in Canada to Five across three continents. A 235% increase in unit capacity.
Agriculture
The agricultural segment consists of two main acquired brands; Salford and MacDon. Aswell as some older ones such as Oros and Harvestec. Putting things in the ground and collecting them once they've grown. Both sides use giant machinery. Guess who makes all sorts of giant machinery... Both of these were acquired more recently, MacDon in 2018 and Salford last year. They spent a combined $1.46 Billion on the two. They paid roughly 10x EBITDA for MacDon & roughly 8x for Salford on a trailing, pre-synergy basis. I should point out that the ag cycle was in a different place a few years ago amidst a sustained period of low farmer capex.
I believe the whole suite of agricultural offerings will add a different dimension of scale to the business. I'd suspect that growth from that sector would offer solid returns if they expand.
Going forward, I believe the EBITDA for the industrial segment (Ag + Lifts) could be in the realm of $400M (see math below & add D&A of ~56M). If a world existed where sums of the parts were valued on par with the parts, (~10x back then) one could imagine that Linamar's industrial assets values might not be fully reflected in their current ~$4B market cap.
The point is, it might be possible that the value, cashflow potential, quality, or whatever you want to go by, is lost within the company. Using rough math from the presentation above I could suggest $3B-$4B in value of industrial [Assuming 1.2B takes the segment from 15% to 25% (slide 17) then add capex, synergies & Salford]. If you prefer for simplicity, ~2x Sales. Yes, this is suggesting that the industrial segment provides a minority of the earnings. I think that can be looked at via multiple lenses.
Numbers
Looking at the guidance given at the Q4 earnings, let's look at what the 'Normalized' earnings would be.
Guidance for both segments was "Double digit sales growth" So let's assume 10%
Mobility Sales in 2022: $6004M
2023 at ~10% Growth: $6600M
Mobility Normalized Margin: 7-10%
Operating Earnings at Midpoint (8.5%): $561M
Depreciation and Amortization would add: ~$400M
Industrial Sales in 2022: $1913M
2023 at ~10% Growth: $2100M
Industrial Normalized Margin: 14-18%
Operating Earnings at Midpoint (16%): $336M
Depreciation and Amortization would add: ~$60M
That's a shade under $900M ($897M) of operating earnings on a normalized basis. Great... now what the heck is an operating earnings. It looks something like EBIT (Earnings Before Interest & Tax). It's far from a perfect measure given the existence of interest and tax but gives some idea of what the earnings power of the business can be beyond the significant factors of Depreciation and Amortization that are parts of this kind of business. It also demonstrates how much growth or acquisition capacity the company has. I am admittedly a bit of a D&A apologist. Yes depreciation is a real thing but it's really just deferred cashflow.
Earnings Sensitivity
An interesting aspect about perpetual 'low margin' businesses is that small changes in margins can make surprising differences for a time.
In 2015 easing commodity prices helped boost earnings.
Recently, inflationary cost pressures in wages, commodities etc have hurt margins.
Last year, Linamar bought a Georg Fischer & Linamar JV "Mills River" which is a foundry not yet operating at a profitable scale. This, and other facilities in the ramp phase can also suppress margins. Linamar has twice suggested that they have a plan to achieve profitability at Mills River in "12 to 18 Months" that sounds like a volume and margin improvement. The swing might be in the neighborhood of $60M (1%-1.5% margin hit was the numbers I've seen suggested)
On the topic of Volume... There are multiple ways for parts companies to grow business. Increased content per vehicle & obviously, more vehicles. This isn't always a 1:1 correlation with total auto sales because demand and inclusion across vehicle types varies.
Industrial segment prices reset in January. Hopefully that should result in a normalized (~500 bps) jump on the segment of roughly $2B in sales.
Linamar also suggested that China's Q1 rebound wasn't exactly expeditious so the margin rebound in autos would likely be delayed.
Supply Chain
You might have heard... there was this chip shortage thing. Basically, if a product is unfinished, it can't ship. This fact has hit Linamar on both sides. On their industrial segment the supply chain disruptions plagued them all year with a gradual bias towards easing. On the auto parts side they got hit on the unpredictable production schedule of their customers who'd stop and start production as they intermittently lacked something from somebody. That side hurts on volume and on costs (paying people with nothing to do). Supply chain disruptions and production schedule are some big unknows going forward. They seem to be improving but remain imperfect.
This is similar to inflation. Labor, energy, transport, and raw materials have been volatile and problematic recently. While it's improving, it's still not back to normal and particularly on labor costs, it remains problematic.
There are a lot of problems. That's what's reflected in the current underutilization of the assets and depressed earnings. I like buying fixable problems, especially when the market doesn't seem to be counting on them being fixed. I don't know what the new normal will be once they are but think there's a lot of reasons why it should look relevantly better. Stock price drives narrative and I believe there's significant room for narrative improvement to get to... and perhaps beyond a more reasonable level in this name too.
Balance Sheet & Deployable Capital
Linamar's last twelve months' EBITDA is roughly $1B. Now as much as growth, MR & price resets should help the company going forward I'm really only looking for rough numbers here. Net debt to EBITDA is roughly 0.5x. Their target leverage is 1.5x (historically it has spent stretches at 1.8 when a suitable acquisition was found).
For this trivial exercise I'll assume that tax is offset by growth. So they should roughly have between 0.5 & 2.5 times their EBITDA to deploy over the next year. That's $500M to $2.5B. I'd have a base case of $1B (to keep ND/EBITDA flat) but an ideal case of $2B (to achieve target leverage).
"Yeah dude that's just business why are you making such a big deal out of it..." Well, I think it matters that the scale of this capital feels noteworthy relative to their market cap. $1B would be over $15/share. $2B would be over $30/share. Certainly some of this is offsetting depreciation. Does it seem relevant to you? By expanding the theoretical to taking it to 2x EBITDA and 2 years, you can come up with +$50/share. Again some is to offset depreciation & more is spending to accommodate growth in existing businesses... but that's real dough.
Basically, they can easily add a relevant asset/business/brand to the organization without issuing equity or taxing the balance sheet more than they wanted. That should add EBITDA, EPS and make the 'ROE' (which I often quote) look better.
The market had a violently negative reaction to learning that Linamar had some good places to invest capital. It was a bit confusing given that this has always been a capital heavy business.
Medical Devices
Linamar first contributed to the medical devices space when the economy shut down in 2020 and ventilators were in short supply. Within weeks they redirected efforts to fill that demand. It didn't make a dent in the capacity or profitability of the company but went to show how flexible they can be and how adept they are at building new products when the need arises. "Manufacturing is manufacturing" is what they said at the time. That wasn't the origin of their desire to enter the medical devices field. It was part of their Linamar 2100 strategy from a few years prior that looked at lasting fields that they wanted to enter for the long term. The agricultural expansion was also part of this. Anyways, they got ISO13485 certified. (Certification needed to produce medical devices) They also have a few medical products in the works. They hope to provide high quality, cost effective solutions for medical devices and precision medical components under their Linamar MedTech umbrella.
I'm not sure when it might be large enough to matter let alone be split in earnings. I do believe that growing in that direction will over time change the perception of the company.
"Auto parts, yuck who care, it's cyclical capital heavy, should have a low multiple" etc
"Ok, they have some industrial and agricultural capacity... at least that's a different type of cyclicality and should offset some sector specific risk"
"Well whatever happens in the economy, the company can have some resilience to make it though carried by their medical devices business."
In other words, If I told you an auto parts business was a good one, you wouldn't believe me. If I told you a brand name industrial and agricultural products business was a good one, you might believe me. If I told you a medical devices business was a good business, you would believe me. The thing is, all can be true, sometimes. Allowing them all to thrive when they can is something that, if you were looking for a long term shift in how the market may look at the company, might unlock the value from stability. Obviously we're a long way from this given that it's currently an irrelevant segment. The company will have half of their current market cap of deployable capital over the next 2-3 years however, so, you never know.
Also, check your biases.
Linamar 2100
Ok, no one here is probably going to be a shareholder of Linamar in 2100. You know who likely will? Blackrock ;) ... just kidding... A member of the Hasenfratz* family. Linda Hasenfratz, the daughter of the Founder is the current CEO. The family still owns 1/3 of the company. The company has Mr Hasenfratz's name all over it. The company thriving in 100 years is certainly a long term goal. While that may not matter for your investment horizon, if order to get there it needs to first thrive though your investment horizon.
Let's pretend we were looking for an aggressive bull case:
What if history rhymes... Well which history...
In the late 1990s Linamar was running at ~30% ROE and trading at 5-6x book in the booming economy.
In the pre-2008 more inflationary & commodity boom cycle Linamar was generating 15% ROEs and trading near 1.5x book. They peaked at ~2.1x book.
In the ensuing recovery it traded at 1.6-3x book while generating high teens to low 20s ROE.
So which past should we compare it to? I don't believe the booming economy of the late 90s is likely to repeat... the Canadian market, led by Nortel, was pretty expensive back then too. I mention it's existence only to suggest that the performance of the last cycle wasn't "Everything perfect, so good it will never be seen again." In cyclical markets, things can... get weird. Also, in each of the last three cycles the peak valuation was above 2x Book (6.6x... yikes 2.1x & 3.2x) In terms of peak cycle stretches, 2/3 cycles had three year peak ROE stretches above 20%. The other inflationary one had roughly 13%.
With that and today's book value we can have a lot of fun.
1 Estimate future book: Current book * (1 + (Peak ROE %))^3
2 Apply target multiple: Peak Multiple * Future Book
In my prior post I looked at a mean reversion towards 15% ROE but used book multiples between 1.5x and 1.7x. The goal was to be realistic and not overly aggressive. The problem is that there's also reflexivity in the situation. If they can get ROE to 20% instead of 15% I'd expect to see more of a multiple expansion. In either case, I was also looking for a true fair value (as again I view this as a stealthily good company that should do just fine as a long term hold from a decent entry point) rather than what I'm going to look at now for a 'if you were trying to measure a hopeful sell target.'
So if we got a good environment for a while... eventually... we could see, (~80*1.2^3)*2.1= $290 (3x book would be $414 after three good years)... yeah I know it sounds ridiculous now. I can't even fathom it but if operations were running at 1997 levels & valuations, the price would have been +$500 today. Maybe I'm saying all this so I feel less crazy for suggesting that it is probably worth closer to $120 than $60 today. Things change over time. That's my point. It also may have permanently changed for the worse. Maybe they never recover operations and things keep declining instead. Maybe ROE goes to 3% and we move towards 0.3x book. Maybe poor capital allocation decisions are made or there are problems and the company loses money consistently. It's all possible, that's why I say that even though I can point to what I think will eventually happen but for me to be right, THINGS NEED TO CHANGE. WE NEED TO SEE IT. It's not because I view the stock as undervalued that the market should bid it to where I think it should be. As I suggested last time, I think the mid 100s is probably a reasonable fair value when things normalize... with growth from there.
Buyback
With my opinion on their intrinsic value part of me would prefer them using this discount to buyback more shares. Academically, if they normalized their leverage ratio to 1.5x by spending $1B buying back 1/4 of the company I believe it would add a ton of value per share. I'd love to increase my holdings by 33%. In practice it won't go that way. CEO own's too much, prices would move in the attempt, it's not exactly in their nature. That said, I will admit to some disappointment that the NCIB (buyback) wasn't renewed yet. Having the option on the table, even if only for exotic events or temporary dislocations, is something I think most companies should have on hand. I understand that they have a lot of capital to spend to fulfil their growth and they don't particularly want to expand the balance sheet only to buyback. Still, that would be my main input. Close enough to or above book, this desire fades unless they can't find anything worth buying/spending money on.
Last Decade & Next Decade
Over the last decade Linamar has;
Taken their book value per share from ~$17 to ~$78
They've acquired: Mubea (2013) Seissenschmidt (2014) Montupet (2016) MacDon (2018) Salford (2022) Amid other JVs and deals.
I can't say whether the next decade will include more or less good years than the last. I realize, only after writing this how much there is going on that might be missed by calling this an auto parts company. I've been part of this problem. They can certainly make most of their money from that business. There's also tremendous value & resilience elsewhere. You also have a proven and aligned management team that has grown a tremendous amount of value by utilizing cashflows from business operations. I believe that will continue. In time, I suspect they'll show the market that it's both undervalued and underrated them at this juncture.
That's enough for today, hope you enjoyed.