Sunday, June 11, 2023

A Day Dreaming

A Day Dreaming


The Dream family of companies recently had their AGMs. While I didn't attend, I listened to them and came away with a few thoughts.

September 6th

Early on my ears perked up when Michael Cooper, speaking as Dream Unlimited's CRO (CEO) announced a future educational event (Teach in) where they'd talk about "how we think we're going to continue making money at the rate we've been making over the last 10 years." Now that's pretty interesting when you consider where NAV/book have gone over the last 10 years compared to the current discount to try to figure out an IRR for today. If one were to use NAV growth as a surrogate for expected return, the numbers get pretty interesting, pretty quickly at a decent range of assumptions on what both of those numbers would be.

It was also said that FFO was shown because some would appreciate it but the company has always and will always focus of growing Net Asset Value. My humble opinion is this is the best way to run and think about real estate companies. It is the gravity which the company will orbit long term. Amounts of leverage, distributions, uses and prices of capital will change over time focusing on growing the terminal value of assets makes the most sense when you can do it as well as Dream.


Infinite Money Glitch

Unlimited spoke about their development activities saying they essentially end up building to 6% cap rates in western Canada... And 10 years debt was available near 4% (3.8%). Now that doesn't sound like much of a clip. 
It isn't, strictly speaking but it's also infinite. Making 2% is very little but it's not really making 2% in that scenario... It's an inflate % because you'd keep the 2% on someone else's incremental capital. Similar to asset management fees.

Use assets + credibility to get capital, use capital to create asset, use asset to pay off the capital... Keep asset + credibility.

Sure, it might not make sense to use 100% debt to finance development at a 2% spread but there's a lot of room for good returns between the infinite % of using all debt and the 6% of using all equity capital. Given however the incremental WC unit being a relatively small cost and portion of the companies' NAV, they can effectively use outside capital for the majority of the development. Also, if you have access to asset specific debt that can be locked in for a long time you can use a significant amount. If those assets become gifts that keep giving the returns can be ridiculous... If not, it consumed less capital.

I'm sure they won't take this idea as far as I suggested above and will have some level of equity backing assets. On the other hand, when looking at incremental capital needs & if we assume they own the land unlevered... 

Developing at 6 or in the 6s and having access to term debt closer to 4 also means that the interest on the higher cost construction loan (6s or 7s) are somewhat misleading when it comes to interest cost modeling. As the assets are completed, the cost of debt decreases as the revenue kicks in to pay off the development.

I took the scenic route to saying: $8 of unproductive land on the BS... Weighing down book value CAGR... Or $15-20 of land in NAV yielding nothing can easily blossom into its own company there without requiring the rest of the business to subsidize it. WC dev is a potentially significant business.

We Prefer Apartments

Cooper made an offhand comment that was interesting to me when he said, "We prefer apartments because they keep on giving." It's interesting because... They don't really have many rental apartments. Most of what they do have on the platform are small stakes via funds and JVs not what they developed. Hopefully this means dream will develop and keep some awesome properties that keep adding value for years and decades to come.

Hundred Baggers

Cooper spoke about some of dream's best performing investments. They bought assets that nobody wanted for very cheap... A cast-off ski hill. An old distillery. And turned them into great desirable, niche places. They develop a culture around them and add to the region. Grow the assets with more vision than math. Long into the future you have assets who yield 100s of % of the companies' cost. Assets worth much... Much more.
I quite liked the story about the investor who told them they 'better not buy that middle of nowhere asset in one of their funds.'

With all the respect in the world for Cooper this does make me wonder about the affordability arm of MPCT. What dream has done fantastically was prove out the ability to visualize and materialize a wonderful experience. Think, Distillery District, A-Basin, Forma. What's completely different is dealing with affordable side of the market and those associated challenges.


Office.

Office remains excessively noisy. The most interesting Cooper remark on Office was around zoning. They provided an example, using their head office building as an example... Of how an office building is worth about $240M whereas if it were empty land with residential zoning, it would probably be worth $300M. Meaning: office zoning essentially has negative value. The implicit suggestion here is that there's a more drastic manner of balancing the currently oversupplied office market. If cities would remove need to replace office space, plenty of residential development would be possible.

This would work towards balancing both markets (resi and office) much quicker and provide cities with more vibrancy and tax revenues. The main problem with this scenario which seems ideal for all parties is it hinges on wise political governance... In other words, it's probably dead on arrival.

D-UN focused the bulk of their presentation on the quality of their assets. Core assets, market leading rent and rent growth. Strong renewals and significant spreads over past leases. Highly in demand restaurants. They're certainly holding up better than many... But I'm sure the toxicity of the asset class weighs on all.

It remained unclear what DRM would be doing with their stake. Cooper didn't sound tremendously bullish even on what the rest of the crew were discussing as tremendous properties. The asset collector in me doesn't really want them to sell any. I have various conflicting thoughts on this whole thing so instead of more back and forth, I'll just wait and see.


US Real Estate


I can't remember which call it was in but Cooper mentioned that 3000 buildings in the US were given back due to changed market fundamentals and credit availability in the country. He also suggested that's going higher. It sounds like RE credit markets aren't going well where it comes to availability.

This plugs in to two other points.
1: Their entrance into the US credit markets with the Aviro partnership. Perhaps there's space and opportunities in the US lending market. Given however that my hopes for that business are that it's an OPM asset management business, I guess the challenge would be convincing investors to step in with funding. I'm not sure how tied to a niche their initiative might me at this point vs broad enough to market the equity fear (on lack of credit availability) as an opportunity. 

2:  A Basin

A-Basin

They mentioned that it doesn't really make sense to sell A-Basin. Their cost basis is 0 and tax would eat too much of the value to justify. They also suggested they they don't have other US assets to offset the tax. They can however use pull capital from the asset while keeping the growing, strong asset.

No US assets, US capital available, people having to give back assets... Need I go on? I don't really know what kind of thing they'd have interest in. As much as I prefer the development side of the business particularly in Resi, the fundamentals in Canada seem far stronger than in the US. The distressed assets also aren't necessarily there. A-Basin, if that's also where the bulk of the capital were to come from, isn't tremendously huge either. They could buy an asset... Or two but couldn't acquire a portfolio. That said, they also suggested they wouldn't need to acquire much because of their current long runway of assets. I for one would love to see the legend of the $4M asset acquisition continue to expand in value across other assets in the country.

Canada Fundamentals


One point brought up in the Impact Trust Q&A I wanted to discuss because I emphatically agree with it. Last year Canada had this wonderful plan to help housing affordability... Build twice as many houses each year. No sarcasm here... It's a good idea. The "how" was a bit less though out. The capital needed to execute on the plan was to be a mere 2x GDP. So naturally they assumed it would just happen without much help. One thing that did brilliantly help is interest rates were raised ~tripling the price of that 2xGDP of capital. That one was sarcasm. Anyways housing starts fell because builders don't want to fight the central bank. So now we need to almost triple housing starts... Lovely.

It's slightly better (worse) than that. The reason we weren't building more before was labor constraints. Constraints which likely don't naturally improve as most of that labor force is far closer to retirement than day 1. Constraints which also mean that infrastructure improvements would consume the same productive capacity that would otherwise be building places to live.

Now imagine how screwed up the situation would be if 30% of construction costs were taxes... 

Replacement Cost

The above point about labor flows into the point about apartments being the gift that keeps giving. Something that many people seem to miss but seems impossibly evident when coming from commodities is that cost of production is paramount. You can always have more of something if the price is high enough to cause people to profitably add capacity. Whereas you get no more of somethings if the price is too low to produce it. (There's of course a lag). It's much more expensive to build a building today than it was 50 years ago. It'll probably be much more dollars in 50 years to build than now. If we're talking about an apartment building... it'll house the same number of people... people who'll be earning much higher wages (in $). The economic value of this apartment will likely increase over time. 

As long as you need to keep expanding capacity... ie growing an economy... prices will need to trace production cost. If you want to understand the main reason why Canada is more expensive than Japan... or Toronto is so much more expansive than Edmonton look no further than the continued need to develop in a constrained area. You can wreck the economy short term and disrupt the incentive to build... overcapacity or negative economic growth, population shrinkage etc. There are a few (Land and Tax) costs which are medium term questions and could in theory decline leading to lower prices... although offset on the developer side. When the need to grow supply returns it will cost money... and probably more money. Better or more in demand areas also contribute to how much people are willing to pay to live there. Higher wages, more entertainment...

Rental properties can provide cashflow as that process works in the background... Location Location Location.


Sovereign Wealth Fund... Part 2?

It was hinted that Dream was trying to duplicate what they did with GIC & Summit. I'm of course all for that. A second deal could easily take NAV in that segment into the mid 20s from high teens. Not that anyone cares about such things. It's amazing really, the market apathy around dream's AM business. This is especially true after they landed their first Sovereign wealth fund partnership. Any catch of that size going forward is a step in value of relevant size for the company as a whole.

I compare an ideal Asset Managers' approach to that of fishing. To have the best chance of success, you want to have a bunch of lines cast and waiting for excitement. Having more funds, at least at a size that the market would accept, wants there are more scenarios for growth. A suspicion I had when they bought more of a stake in the distillery district was they may have been setting up a future Retail REIT. 

Ideally someday they have a retail REIT, a Canadian residential REIT, more private Canadian funds, some US public stuff etc... that way there'd be more scenarios that could provide them with funds. The issue of course is that each needs it's own scale and liquidity not to mention their own management team... Associated costs etc.

I'm sure they'd love to have a second asset class with scale. Industrial has been the majority of their asset management success... It now makes up a disproportionately large portion of their fee bearing AUM. It's the only public field I could see able to make bite-sized additions and partnerships that would make significant jumps for DRM's AM growth.

Tax

I am one investor who wasn't the least bit surprised about the mention by DRM's CEO about the tremendous amount of time he spends on tax. I'm not just saying that to try to sound like a know it all jackass. I've been thinking a lot about it myself especially since tax season 2022. 

Most of the excess returns on an asset purchase are front loaded... You see something differently, maybe you get it right or something changes. The value moves to where you expect... Then what. For an asset to get there... Say 5-10x the initial price, it probably needs to prove a lot of value, deleverage, grow, add stability, normalize the bargain price, etc. You then are left with a bigger asset with more average prospects and return profile at the asset level. You can sell it and reinvest the proceeds... After tax, losing a chunk of your gain in the swap. Or you can pull capital from that improved asset value (an asset with an average cashflow yield & average prospects) to invest in an asset with superior prospects.

Further, the mechanics when it comes to writing off interest vs the tax efficiency of certain income streams and nuance of different tax laws make it quite beneficial to put ample consideration of tax ramifications of virtually everything. Depreciation & amortization etc. Were I operating an asset collecting platform on any relevantly sized scale, I'm sure tax would be a huge part of most decisions.

The margin of alpha in many investments is so slim that it's hard to really benefit to an excess degree over time if you have to keep taking hits on tax every time you want to deploy capital. This is especially the case when you have perfectly good assets that should easily more than cover the cost of the capital you'd pull from them. Doubly so if you had an actual business with access reasonably priced fixed debt. Managing small things like D&A properly have a multiplied downstream impact on returns when operating cashflow can support new investments which offer high returns. Assets can have tons more value than what the taxable earnings they spit out might suggest. As I suggested much earlier, NAV or fair value of the assets is key... This isn't always the same thing as book value.

It's a bit of a relief to know that I haven't been the only one obcesing over the tax lens of investing. I feel a bit less crazy. I do find it a bit amusing given part of what's special about DRM, in my opinion vs the many cheap stocks out there and perhaps even slightly cheaper RE peers is that I think dream offers superior long term tax efficiency. I guess we'll see if that's the case.

Conclusion

I started this reflecting on some AGM thoughts. By this point however, I find myself looking at the company's intermediate future in a way I hadn't quite before. A billion dollar asset management business. A billion dollar western Canada homebuilding business. A billion dollar urban development business. A billion dollars worth of REIT unit holdings & other stabilized assets. That's four distinct categories which could all single handedly be worth more than the current market cap in a few years. All of which are both self sufficient and strengthened by their connection to the rest of the business. Dream will continue to work towards solving Canada's housing shortage to the degree they can. Rate hikes will continue to slow the industry and make the problem worse short term. I believe demand will be resilient based on supply and demand fundamentals, likely for years to come. As for me, I'll probably try to collect a few more shares over time if prices remain as discounted as I believe they are.

Disclosure: At the time of this article I own $DRM.TO & $MPCT-UN.TO as well as indirect stakes in other entities mentioned in this article.
Not investment advice, please see (Can Do Investing: Ground Rules) page for more information.

 

Sunday, May 21, 2023

Canadian Housing... Bubble?

Canada Housing... Bubble?


Housing in Canada is perhaps the most discussed topic. In fairness... We don't have much else. You'd think with as much land as we have and as much discussion as the topic received that we'd be able to easily solve any availability issues. You'd think.

The problems with housing starts with an inconvenient point. Despite the vastness of our empty country searching for relevance, most people want to live in half a dozen places. Particularly two that get the most discussion (Toronto & Vancouver). Both of which have water and transportation issues somewhat boxing them in. Anyways everyone agrees they're ridiculously expensive, particularly for the young family.

Mostly answers to such problems there are two simple answers. 
1: Move elsewhere. While sounding simple, people understandably don't want to listen to the "it's not that hard, just leave the place where you were born and raised that has all the jobs" argument. That's fine, so we should go to option 2

2: Build More. Easy right... Right... Here's my biggest problem with some of the complaints. (Let's pretend that people don't fight against development). It's expensive to build.

Building:
You need Land
+
Plan
Plan includes zoning, building permits, engineering work
+
Money
Your capital, debt, backing for the risk (pre-sales)
+
Incentive
Developers need to have a reason to develop, so that's profit - tax paid - interest

If you add up all the costs, you get something like this

You better believe this has increased since 2020.

In other words, if you want more supply, you need prices at that level minimum. Recently I saw someone talking about the ridiculous price of Toronto condos... the same person a few weeks earlier was asking 'now that prices are almost such that developers can't make money, what do they do? will they sell at a loss or wait?' I CAN'T MAKE THIS UP... but this story explains so much... why do developers pre-sell units to investors? Why hasn't supply been more responsive in 'bubble' prices? Why have prices been so high for so long? INCREMENTAL SUPPLY IS VERY EXPENSIVE. A bubble... with costs close to construction costs.

Beyond that you need policy to help (and there's definitely policy available to help) 

If you work that out as a baseline to compare against, the market isn't that bad. 

On the other hand, if you look at what has happened in the market, the obvious levels of shooting ourselves in the foot is killing me.

Mechanically: Raise rates= raising payments 

So we've collapsed the incentive to produce more supply while artificially made housing less affordable 👍👏👍👏.

At least immigration has been lower so the market can catch...

... Nevermind.

Ok but we must be working off a very high production base... After all prices are in "bubble territory" in some people's minds.
That's a matter of perspective



My perspective is: no... but I'm sure some would disagree. Like, it would be high if population growth was at 2005 or 1970 or 1985 levels... but last year we added 2.5x the growth that we had in those periods.

Even within the G7 Canada has low housing stock








Compared to the US population growth & starts 




So here we are... Market so concerned about 2008/9 that we're being cautious with investment.

Ironically, prices had received declined more on a % YoY basis than they did in the GFC.

I've all but given up trying to explain why I'm super bullish on developing real estate in Canada longer term. It hasn't mattered for months. I get it, price is going to hurt with rate hikes or a weaker economy. I also understand that my volume businesses may take a hit because of the margin hit and caution.

Do you see how that makes the problem worse (investment outlook better) afterwards?

What I believe the main constraint should/will be is labor. At this moment I'm sure some genius is about to tell me how rate hikes will help with that because the layoffs from interest rate sensitive sectors (like housing) will provide labor. But my point is there is a realistic concern about the right skilled labor availability to build as many dwellings as we'd need. I think the market will mostly figure it out but I also don't see why we need hundreds of thousands of tech worker immigrants but don't bring immigrants who want to build homes.

Hate on Pre-Con sales

One narrative that really grinds my gears is the hate out there for people 'speculating' on pre-constructed condos. (P.S. I've never done this). Builders need capital to develop $250M buildings. Banks don't want to take price risk, nor do builders. So builders often need to sell units before they build. Given that the entry home buyer uses their home as a place to live, they're less able to dish out large amounts of money years before there's a place to live. Investors step in and fund the development.

Yes, you understood that right, without those speculators that get all the hate, there'd be less supply and even higher prices. No... Adding speculative supply isn't jacking up prices. I understand it's an emotional topic but please think logically.
I know someone is going to read this and want to tell me why they're evil for different reasons. "They're funding the wrong type of housing, they're adding one bedroom that no one wants" again, I understand that people see the need for more family sizes units but understand that those take much more space and much more money to build. Understand also that if there weren't huge amounts of demand for those (despite the narrative) that prices & rents would look different and the market would react differently.

Demand to live in Canada and those cities has been enormous. It certainly hasn't been handled perfectly but the situation is far less inexplicably crazy or bubble-like than many imply.

People really hate people keeping properties as investments but again, they put up the same capital that can be used to build more and use that unit to (in their own small way) push down rent prices. Every unit rented out is added supply. Added supply reduces rent.

1988

There was a news article from 1988 about how unaffordable Toronto was. Seen Here Everyone wanted to be there then and everyone wants to be there now. Things that everyone wants, not everyone can have. That comes out by things being deemed unaffordable. P.S. if you invested in a condo in 1988, you did ok on price. If you include the leverage that a mortgage would provide, you did great financially.

Gold vs Toronto


Toronto Real Estate is a bubble... I mean according to everyone... But is gold?


Prices that keep going up always inspire people to jump to bubble conclusions. Meanwhile, a crappy currency like ours (not complaining, there are certainly far worse) loses value all the time. If populations are going to grow, costs of real estate will be tied to costs of production. Declining currency into a broadly increasing economy means more wealth chasing the most core in demand locations... Higher demand. Some people's ideas of affordable may not match the realities of building a house. Plus as Tim Melton put it, Even back when houses were under $20'000 all people could talk about was how expensive they were. The more things change, the more they stay the same.


Taxes

Speaking of costs of production... I think people would be astounded at how much of the cost of new housing is essentially tax. This report Will Feds Answer the Call identifies the huge percentage of the cost of production that is effectively tax. hint it's HUGE.
Yes that's 288k or nearly 1/3 of the price that are taxes just being passed along to the final purchaser... That's almost triple the developer's margin & more than wages of the team spending months building the house.

It's also been growing as a share
It's pretty crazy to think about. At 5% interest rates it's mean paying an added $1200 per month in interest... just on the tax



 So if we want to improve this in a sustainable way this is, to me, the simplest, best and least intrusive way to make things much better. (Targeted tax breaks for certain aspects of the industry). I think we could get prices down 25% with the right policy... Of course that would be temporary as the currency depreciation aspect and others will essentially mean over time prices likely keep going up.


FHSA

The FHSA isn't the best idea but isn't the worst. It also demonstrates a willingness for a targeted solution. For those not following: the First Home Savings Account or (First home tax free savings account) is something that I believe most young, income earnings non home owners should look into. It's tax deductible like a RRSP but has the benefit of not being taxed in the future (like TFSAs) the catch being that it must be used towards the purchase of a first home within a certain (but quite long) time. It's targeted because only non-homeowners can open one. Imperfect because on a basic level, if everyone has more money to bid for a price that doesn't improve the competition dynamics.

Interest Rates

People (who ignored history, logic and data) thought that higher interest rates would make housing more affordable. It's an easy story to tell yourself. Rates up = price down... that must be good for affordability right? WRONG. The price goes down BECAUSE there's less affordability at the prior price. Affordability only improves when rates stop increasing. Homes aren't bought all cash, what's actually purchased in an ongoing payment. Although the price goes down, the payment actually goes UP. Don't take my word for it, look at the last 50 years of data and see if you can see what happens to affordability ever time interest rates are raised.

Unfortunately, it's even worse than that... We agree that interest rate hikes drive down prices... so let me ask you, with lower prices, foes that incentivize more or less supply?

Unfortunately, it's still even worse than that... Building houses is expensive. Lots of money is needed up front to build. Raising interest rates is the definition of making that money more expensive. Just like with taxes... that cost must at some point be passed on to end buyers... or result in less volume at the margin.

We're really stupid.


ACTUAL IDEAS

Cut taxes on labor, materials, land transfer, development, sales etc.
Ease zoning restraints, if people want to spend lots of money on building residences don't make their life hell.
    Also, if someone wants to replace an office building with residences... let them
Offer developers lower interest rates for their construction.

Look, I've probably convinced no one of anything. So here's my suggestion. If you believe that houses are ridiculously expensive, build one and sell it... Make a fortune... if you can.


Release Valve 

It does bring up the question of a release valve. I mean we didn't solve much on pricing in this post... We just looked at why it's the case. So if people can't afford to live in downtown Vancouver, where can they afford?

Perhaps more interesting, why is there cheaper? After all, one of the best arguments I've heard for being bearish an asset with thousands of years of track record of being an appreciating asset is that it's just too dang expensive an entry point. The answer I come to is, 1: cheaper land. 2: easier permetting (less development timeline) 3: more favorable construction industry. IE lower costs, lower costs and you guessed it... lower costs.

The one I keep seeing, perhaps because all the options in the public equity market seem to point there, is Alberta. Alberta had both spare capacity from the last oil boom & one of the most conducive building environments... Also with spare capacity. Well, they've tightened significantly last year along with much of the rest of the country.

Note: Q1 of 23 was 'only' 45k (source Statistics Canada & me)


Just because I give you This table of declining vacancy rates doesn't mean that the market cares.

In reality we're nowhere near the equity prices of the last time people cared about Alberta. We're perhaps on average 1/3 of the valuation vs last time. On one hand that makes sense. People got burned by the excitement last time. We still haven't recovered from that. People now look at any boom as an inevitable bust. On the other hand, in the last cycle, such a ridiculous amount of money was first made in Alberta (pre 08)... That expectations may have became unhinged. My favorite anecdote is a company (which I didn't own then) that increased their dividend 100x through the cycle. Another company with land in the region was trading at 3x book value. Today the first company trades at 1/3 of their book value & the other, I'd argue the land is free in today's market cap.

We've gone from forgetting busts exist to forgetting booms exist. 



Sunday, May 14, 2023

Dream Unlimited Power

Dream Unlimited Power 

Dundee Real Estate Asset Management otherwise known as DREAM Unlimited... Or in accordance with the thought I frequently have when hearing "Unlimited"...Dream Unlimited Power is the real estate company central to today's article. 


$DRM.TO is in my opinion a highly underappreciated Canadian company... Or at least it was until we decided to pop the real estate bubble and take prices back 30 years because construction cost no longer matters due to the fact that we're never going to construct another building. So +20 years of great results don't matter, obviously it's different at this time.

With that in mind, I'm going to write the rest of this as though I'm oblivious to that paragraph.

I want to talk for a second about book value. Quite basically, book value is normally what money you put into something. There are of course adjustments in some instances, some RE gets marked to fair value depending on the structure... But if you were to build a service, that would have no tangible value. If you buy a ski hill that now generated annual profits in excess of what you paid for it (growth or inflation) it can generate very high returns on equity because it's book value isn't fair market value. Land, same thing. The more you can use those assets for incremental return, whether that's through leveraging some of their true value for capital, earnings incremental returns on those assets or something else it gives companies the ability to, over time, amplify how far above book value their intrinsic value is. The only limit with this compounding ability over the long term is to keep finding high return places to deploy capital.






Dream 1.0 was 20+ years of growing real estate book value very quickly. They grew at high teens to low 20% CAGR for a long time because they were very good at deploying capital & developing real estate. In and of itself that's probably worth a nice premium to a book value that gets further outdated by the day... Or at least would if we still needed more real estate in the future. Sorry Dream 1.0 

Dream 2.0 is what we're starting to witness and what we were thinking about last year. Dream is now focusing on the unlimited power of capital light business. Growing a capital heavy business, like real estate or industrial (etc.) quickly means you're good at spending money. Your main limitation is money. You only have so much to spend because you only have so much. What if you could have more... You know

"Shut up and take my money",... And pay yourself a little fee to invest it.

Dream's recent pivot has been & I believe is very close to demonstrating why book value was nice while it lasted. They're building an expansive and rapidly growing asset management platform. Adding an additional business that can... In the right market... Grow at an almost unlimited pace. Better yet without needing to devote the bulk of their capital to achieve incremental growth.


Asset Management & Dream Industrial


Some people believe Dream should sell the Dream Industrial vehicle. It's a good point to think about. Dream would walk away with +$270 Million. Dream Office would also be infused with roughly $450M in pretax cash. Both could do a lot of accretive capital allocation with that much capital in this environment. It would equate to maybe ~25x trailing EBITDA on the asset management fees.
My problems with that scenario are;
1: Deploying that capital would be difficult. The trading liquidity of the in house options coupled with the facts that DRM & Cooper already have enormous stakes limit the open market buying potential. Then take-privates would need to happen closer to book (if not at or above it if the business is going to be desired in the future) office could almost SIB itself to private... If you want more office exposure.
Impact, Residential and Dream don't trade. 
So they're left with trying to take control of a REIT they don't own or essentially selling at private market prices only to buy at private market prices.
2: They'd be leaving their biggest public exposure to the strongest real estate asset class. DIR is probably their best shot of near term being able to grow public AUM. DIR also allowed Unlimited to add a private US industrial AM business line & $6B in private Industrial AUM with the GIC/Summit transaction. It's their biggest, most relevant tool for casually stumbling into more asset management growth.

It's weird but this spin off of a spin off business is probably a core asset at this point. Besides, they haven't got to the best part yet.

Asset of Tomorrow

 
Dream is a chimera (part lion, part goat, part dragon) it's difficult if not impossible to value for that reason. The main asset of today is used to create the main asset of tomorrow. It's the mark of quality business and capital allocation. So what's the asset of tomorrow?  What gets minimal notice today but is a company maker in the future?

For me, it's the $DIR-UN.TO performance incentive bonus. Looking at P/E or EV/EBITDA or any trailing metric for that reason and you might think it's worth 0. Next year perhaps something but very little eventually...

Well, it goes something like this Dream Industrial has a hurdle rate for their FFO. It increases by half of CPI. Currently it's roughly $1. For every cent over it, DRM gets roughly $0.01 per share in pure profit (EBITDA).

(Twitter: @CDNVALUESTOCKS aka Tyler) highlighted this in another one of his great and extensive write-ups on dream. Seen Here If you're interested in the company after this I recommend reading both of his write-ups. I do weigh in some here indirectly but 100% respectfully. He suggests a discounted cash flow to model what this asset is worth. 

I don't love DCF's as a rule, they aren't fair to tails in compounding. Using a reasonable mean isn't how things play out. I understand that a model is meant to be approximately what's coming not an exact representation of the future but their linear look at the evolving future rarely captures dynamic markets.

In this case there are a few aspects that have me unreasonably un-consensus on this asset.

Let's say that after this year FFO will be flat vs the hurdle... Worth exactly $0 in earnings but any incremental growth is 1:1... I don't think people appreciate how strong industrial real estate has been. Rents are up significantly in recent years even into Q1 of 2023 they were up relevantly QoQ. Canadian rents in DIR's portfolio had a 50% spread to market. After Q1 that's probably higher... On higher rents. But that doesn't matter for our 'after 2023' scenario right? Wrong. For the same reason that this spread exists, it will continue to exist. Only about 10% of rents roll over each year to capture the new, much higher rents. Higher rents and FFO... And incentive fee. So REITs who normally return most of their capital and don't grow much, have pent up growth well beyond forward CPI. 




Also, DIR just entered a JV with GIC to buy a REIT with lots of development land. A JV which will pay them the capital light property management fees in addition to letting them deploy capital at rates to further compound FFO/Unit. Barely to mention, taking them up to their target leverage ratio while further growing.

Ok but all this you can kinda model out right? I mean you can be more or less aggressive but it's somewhat straight line... What you can't is this. What happens next time that the public market likes industrial REITs (of which basically 3 remain in Canada). So what happens if they work their was through the pent up growth to for a random example 1.50 in FFO vs 1.20 hurdle... Then REITs are interesting again and they can grow unit count 33% in an accretive way. 0.30 becomes 0.40 from units then 0.45 from the accretion. I guess I can also just point to the many layers of factors that influence the future value as things that would complicate a model.

Plus if you can get further ahead of the hurdle, the more of DIR's incremental growth benefits DRM. Basically, the compounding potential of this asset is incredible. Tremendous leverage to the success of DIR and that's in addition to the rest of the NAV based asset management fees. Yet today, it's not part of the picture. In my honest opinion, that's why they're not looking too closely at selling the REIT for what would be a significant windfall profit relative to today's DRM market cap. The long term potential of the dual stream of profits from the partnership are very valuable. 

For reference to DIR's FFO of the last few quarters was:
0.22 in Q3 2022
0.23 in Q4 2022
0.25 in Q1 2023
At the end of 2022 the hurdle was 1.00 (Note their guidance was 90s so it sounds like there's a step back coming. Also Interest expense will likely be less favorable to DIR going forward)

The whole asset management side of the business is "In addition to" 
AM is in addition to asset growth
Performance bonus is in addition to asset management fees.
Neither requires more money once set up... That's a nice offset to the capital heavy development business.

Industrial real estate is in my opinion the crown jewel of real estate in markets recently. Public markets still (or again) are trading at discounts & development demand is pretty strong. It's not the cheapest of the categories but offers some organic growth. It's fortunate that DRM is overweight it on the asset management side. I think it offsets some uncertainty on the office side. Not to mention that their office equity should probably be supported by the DIR stake. (Note this was written before *that* I'll address it later)

I've stated in the past in a few conversations that a pure play industrial on NAV reversion was probably a simple trade that works... Unfortunately I was too stupid to do it because I viewed there as being far cheaper ways to get industrial exposure... Which have naturally vastly underperformed. Sum of the parts discounts, (while often great value and value add opportunities) sure do drive you crazy in the intermediate term...

More Leverage 

Their western Canadian land holdings... Held at old cost. They can use debt from that spread to incrementally develop at a higher yield than interest. That's incremental recurring income growth from tomorrow's assets. If we look at what the dream iMPaCT trust has been able to do (pull capital from paper gains on assets and use it to develop other assets) I think we can develop an appreciation for what's possible with Dream's land developments. Real estate in general fascinates me in this regard. Land + reputation= great potential. If they can develop to a high enough yield on cost to cover debt + amortize, the returns on the incremental equity that the company needs to provide are... Ummm... High? Yet for now, again, this land isn't generating any recurring value based on how the company (and I) would measure it. The 'dead money' land assets can generate great ROEs going forward.

Problems With Measuring Development


The elephant in the room is almost becoming the 'Build to sell' segment. It's irregularities mean I don't ascribe much value to the develop to sell business' cashflow on any given year. I almost certainly should. It is after all what has driven a tremendous amount of value to date. I prefer not counting on anything that isn't recurring when discussing multiple (this is probably why I'd willingly suggest that it's not incredibly special from a earnings perspective). This also hurts construction businesses. The market doesn't adequately appreciate them. The earnings & cashflows are all over the place. Some years are great, others completely lacking. Normally this type of erratic line of business would be valued off of book value. Which makes it highly unfortunate that I believe that 'book value' is about to be out of date in a big way.

People prefer stable cashflow and linear growth. They want a model to point to a cashflow that goes up and to the right otherwise every time Dream has a good year it proceeds to set off the "declining EPS" alarm bells right after. There's a cohort of investors able to use their brains and not their computers to work past this but it makes the idea of a FFO multiple less likely to be helpful or useful either way. Western Canada may have some type of regularity or not but I don't think city development ever will. Neither will ever be as stable as real estate NOIs or asset management fees.

I don't know what the answer is to this. They should definitely keep developing, it earns great returns. Even if (I &) the market doesn't appreciate it adequately when the profit arrives with a multiple, from a 30000 foot view we can appreciate the snowball effect. Having your own NAV estimate somewhat works but guarantees perpetual discounts.

Discounts are mathematically almost irrelevant to the long to infinite term investor. Half of 50 still doubles to reach half of 100. Valuation can of course improve or deteriorate but if value keeps going in the right direction the bulk of the returns will be the same. I say that with the full realization of what the last decade held for Dream's stock. There's a realistic limit to multiple contraction. I highly doubt we're going to 0.05x book. I suspect the valuation will eventually revert to something that looks more reasonable... whether that's fundamentals catching down or price catching up, it's too soon to say. The latter is better. If they keep doing their thing and shareholders keep holding, the day to day price doesn't matter as much anyways.

Dream Residential

Dream residential is a very odd asset but I wanted to mention it briefly. It IPO'd at a very unfortunate time. They missed the period where they may have been able to raise 10s or 100s of millions and entered the market when everything was falling apart. It's ideal to have a residential REIT in the public markets as sometimes it can probably be a great AM exposure to have. That said... having a US focused REIT listed in USD on the TSX seems a little abnormal to me. Don't get me wrong, it's not the only one & can still do well in the right environment but it's different. For a combination of reasons, it's now sitting there at 45% of NAV paying a +5% distribution & buying back units. DReaM's stake in it is relatively small for the time being but I still like their optionality with this vehicle. I was a bit surprised at the launch about the US focus. After all it was Cooper who said on the iMaPCT conference call that the capital necessary in Canada to accommodate growth was 'insane.'

Tweaking Estimates 

It's not all good news. 
Their much higher interest expense from last year will likely be higher still this year. 
Stabilized income from the same assets will likely be higher.
New properties come online so that portion of the debt can get cheaper (mortgage debt is cheaper than construction loan/line of credit). Other completed assets can be sold to free up capital.
The SG&A will likely come down a little without the settlement. 
Impact Trust's distribution was cut by 60% which will more than offset increased stake.
AM likely to increase.
Still I can make the argument that measuring it even on a FFO or at least recurring FFO perspective, they're not all that impressive today. There are certainly peers that trade at lower equity cashflow multiples & equally large discounts to assets.
I also believe that some of the torrid book value CAGR has been or is being sacrificed to support growth in the asset management platform. Essentially less doubling down on short term bets and more conversion to stable value... I hope this is more of a start-up feature of having exposure to many classes of RE to grow from. the asset management growth has been spectacular. That is more a function of having all the fishing poles in the water than the adding of own built assets. It's hard to argue with the book value growth results from DREAM's development business running it as they did for the long term.

There's also office exposure that, while above average in the asset class, is still office.

They also do some bizarre things from time to time that I don't quite understand but trust their experience. Spending millions on a stake in the distillery district with REITs trading at half NAV... While also directionally targeting having more liquidity. Or starting a debt venture... Which could be great or terrible but I don't have the information to know yet.

There's also higher interest rates across the board which isn't great & is punishing development... Great policy for dealing with expensive housing right!!! 

Also, most listed REITs trade at substantial discounts to their Net Asset Values. So while this provides dream an effective way to amplify the capital they deploy... It also limits their otherwise almost unlimited ability to raise new outside money. I would point out that they're doing well with their balancing of public vs private asset gathering. One is virtually always at a premium to the other. Having this balance allows them to bridge the valuation gap by raising capital on one side and buying assets from the other. It works and can make sense in both directions.

Pre-GIC numbers on top, Post GIC chart below. 2020 dip was Dream Global sale in 2019.


Value

It's difficult for me to point to a metric and suggest it should trade at AxB or Q% of Z. If the market wants to look at a P/B relatively in line with an arbitrary market number, that's fine. Trading inexpensively doesn't hurt anyone. I believe we are in a transition period. Asset focus to asset management focus. We're still in the murky middle & I believe that's caused excess volatility.

What's it worth? if you want a specific answer, No idea. There are too many moving parts... None of which tell you about the much bigger question... What will it be worth. To that I dare not give my answer to where I believe the fair value will be in the distant future. 

TD
Toronto Dominion... (Wow I feel old calling it that) estimated Dream Unlimited to have a NAV of $70/share a few months ago. I don't know that I can come up with a better number for a net asset value. Now, as I said before sum of the parts often get discounts ✅. Real estate is out of favor ✅. People hate office exposure ✅. Land public market discount ✅. 
They say that makes them worth $43 to the market. Based on very little I had something like $45 in mind as a reasonable valuation in this kind of environment. 


TD's NAV of $31.5 for the asset management arm both feels quite high and doesn't. I pencil it at $15-18 today (Up from $10-12 last year)... But...if I told you that there was this asset light business growing sales nearly 50% CAGR and had $1/share of run rate free cash flow (as they might going forward), it's the type of thing that I could imagine the market assigning a multiple which some might find ridiculous. (Well above 30). I think it alone will eventually be worth enough to make this an attractive investment. My assessment of today's $15-18 reflects a skeptical real estate market offsetting past AM growth and a less forward looking market when it comes to growth trends. In plain English, I believe that numbers will be low if things go mostly as planned.

Measuring the assets is far messier. Public REIT equities trade at severe discounts to their stated NAVs, sometimes justified, sometimes not. Depending if we want to discuss today's NAV price, today's market price or what could be the value years out in XYZ scenario you can come up with 0 or a lot of value. Different discounts for different assets make coming up with an exact number both pointless and impossible.

I don't particularly want any kind of separation because, while I think the shares might initially like the simplicity, I think there are benefits to the complicated structure. Using strengths to capitalize on weaknesses. A discount to "whatever" fair value is, can be a positive if it means fair value can be grown faster.
Point and case being the ability to use EBITDA generated from AM to cover development debt interest service. Also, it's not like many of the parts would be fully appreciated in this market either.

As much as I rave about the Asset Management business, I'm reminded of a spin-off example used in a book. Marriott spun their assets out from their management business (or vice versa) hotels sucked and were out of favor... Hence the spin. The spinoff asset heavy business (hotels... yuck) proceeded to outperform the capital light business. I'm not saying that in favor of a spin but instead to point out that there can easily be a tremendous amount of value hidden in assets that the market hates... Again. It's almost like asset heavy businesses can be good over the long term or something... nah.

I'm half shocked at how cheaply shares can be had at this juncture, given the prospects and risk/reward. 
A rapidly growing asset management platform 
Quality Real Estate
Great Capital Allocation
Great Reputation

Then I remember
Office is dead
Residential is toxic because of "Bubble" narrative (This is the story I take the biggest issue with)
Land is irrelevant (until it isn't)
Debt is more of a burden
And the asset management income was still relatively small.
Dream is fairly small company that trades less than $1M/day with 1.5 analysts.

Last Quarter

Looking at the last quarterly results I think we saw all of this. Asset management had a good quarter even on half a quarter of GIC. A-Basin had strong numbers, it's only a shame that this small and seasonal. it had nearly 20% YoY growth.
Then you had the known step down in FFO from unit distributions (Dream Impact Trust cut their distribution). As much as a quarterly $8.7M from real estate distributions feels like it would warrant a decent value multiple. The strength of the two trusts that constitute that might tell a different story. The stability of real estate revenues is somewhat undercut but the fact that the segment is lower YoY and Office yield is high.
Then you have every other segment which, in this quarter looked like liabilities. My main reason for thinking reporting FFO wouldn't do much is apparent in the Development GTA/Ottawa line... 
2022 FFO = $30.5M
2023 FFO = $-1.7M
That's why this looks erratic, any given quarter a future asset looks like a liability because of the debt and interest on the development.
I showed this chart next to 3 others which underperformed it but were more stable and asked which people preferred. Most people placed this last because of the instability making it look riskier.

Net it all out and you get a relatively illiquid real estate company with average metrics... To the average observer. Remember, metrics are a snapshot at a point in time.

At some point, earnings, dividends, cash flows, whatever you want to measure with... Will show up in a big way. The stock will eventually track some kind of fair value. If bulls are right that's higher today and will be far higher in the future. If mistakes are made, or markets change in unexpected ways, value may well be lost first. I'm content with the bigger picture I see and the direction I believe is being set up for years and decades to come. That's why I continue to own. 


Addendum On Dream Office Move


I wrote the core of this before Dream Office's recent DIR sale + Substantial issuer bid. 

As I reflect on in the core of the article, Unlimited has a lot of their portfolio exposure in industrial; most of their AUM & a substantial portion of indirectly held equity. Now the recent headache has been their strongest performer of recent years (industrial) is held within their weakest performer (office).

Office is effectively trying to trade half of their Industrial for 1/4 of their (Office + Industrial).
The added wrinkle being that DRM (which owns 36% of that entity, may tender some of their stake into this transaction at nearly half of their stated NAV.

You could read this as "Their one chance to escape sinking Office"
I'm not sure I but that because if you valued office at $0 you'd only be paying something close to NAV for the DIR+ residential density added development.

So is office really that bad that they want out at $0? Well here's where there are more pieces to the puzzle. Office isn't the only entity trading at a huge discount to their stated net asset value. MPCT, DRR and DRM itself. Selling $1.00 for $0.50 sounds pretty dumb and demeaning to that $1.00 but if that capital can then be used to buy $1.00 for $0.33, you'd add a lot of value from the transaction.

However, neither would particularly explain the other point of debate on the transaction... Why sell industrial units at 84% of NAV when (assuming NAV is real and accurate) you could sell buildings at 100% of NAV. I'd assume that at a minimum, the liquidity to easily make the sale isn't easily available.

Of course skeptics would point to the "obvious fact" that NAV is effectively a made-up number. Particularly for Office. Many people will ironically effectively use this argument to decide that the only true answer to "Then what's it actually worth?" Is "Less." Less than NAV? No... Less than the market cap. Anyway. I'm still in the camp that I wouldn't be in office at NAV but half NAV for good locations, asset level debt & long term leases seems more likely a bit much.

I truly don't know what to think about the transaction. I was actually mainly getting quite interested in D-UN because it was DIR +Dev with Office free. The market had no care about anything beyond the office name. In that way, selling the DIR to get more levered long office makes it less appealing from that perspective. I was content with them NCIB &SIB-ing themselves to private by disposing of the incremental office. I wanted DRM to effectively own the core of the portfolio.

I'm not sure I much prefer the capital going to MPCT (which while cheaper has a large DRM stake and overlap already with DRM and also trading liquidity headwinds) or DRM directly which is again, trading volume constrained & Cooper stake limited with how much can realistically be bought. DRM has also been discounted vs NAV more and longer and so when measuring the discount vs the normal discount & weighing that against external opportunities to add value it's less special.
Ie: If you can always buy $1 for 0.70 in DRM buybacks (with the limited amount you can buy DRM) so for a similar discount it makes more sense to put the money elsewhere when those opportunities present.

In the end, I suspect the whole situation on both sides was about right-sizing exposures as much as other things. They may not want to have that much capital in the office exposure, may want to add some to MPCT or Buybacks. I don't think their % ownership will be much lower after this... Particularly because the response has left a large spread between tender price and trading price... People seem to assume that it will be more than fully tendered. (Holders may get less than their desired fill & the price is assumed to fall afterwards). I don't want to speculate at who or how much at this point. They will own between 16% and 50% after, they may simply tender 25% of their holdings inline with the offer and see what happens with what everyone else wants to do. I've watched this type of thing go both ways in extreme manners (seen essentially only large insiders tender & seen insiders tender 0). There are lots of effective places where capital can be put in real estate (if NAVs are remotely accurate) so I'm not overly concerned.

A Concluding Note


Investors gravitate towards a single story. Sometimes that means getting tomorrow's price, sometimes it means the share price is being cursed by a fraction of your exposure. I believe Dream is built in a way where there is tremendous long term value add potential. I also believe it's built in a way that makes it unlikely for the market to reflect all of that in real time. Fair value will continue to be a longer term center of gravity.  

There are a few potential catalysts for the recovery of the stock/sentiment. We seem to have flown right past the Toronto RE price rally we've seen off the recent short term bottom but if that keeps going, at some point it will be evident that DRM and MPCT are doing well with those projects. Rate decreases would probably do a bit to get people taking a fresh look at real estate. My confidence in central banks doing something reasonable was minimal but completely evaporated 8 months ago. Anyways, the Canadian consumer is beyond tapped out and has organically growing mortgages at these rates. Without human QE we'd be in a severe recession with the blame squarely on the bank of Canada. That's just an opinion, the rails saying we're currently in a mild recession amid 2% population growth are facts. I believe rates should be and will be lower eventually. I think that will double juice real estate (cap rates on higher mark to market rents & lower interest). A peak & reversal in office vacancy could also make things interesting in slow motion. If D-UN no longer looked like a value black hole there's a rather large spread to overcome between stated private value and assumed value. If MPCT-UN completes their development without issue and de-levers they too might look pretty interesting at higher levels.

The foray into asset management has this far been very successful but with the exception of perhaps a few months last year, has been mostly ignored. It's actually pretty amazing what they have been able to do with GIC in this rather awful environment for asset managers... but no one cared. At this point, and this price, that's getting a bit nonsensical. I think within 2-3 years it'll be apparent that only the asset management business should be worth more than today's market cap. We'll probably still be talking about a discount to NAV then. The development business will still look like a drain in all the quarters it doesn't deliver 10s of millions in profit. The asset base will likely be larger too.  It definitely seems like a target rich environment to deploy incremental capital. I believe they'll be adding long term value with every dollar they deploy on the asset side so even with all the AM focus I think the asset value (book) per share will continue to do just fine.

I think the price is extremely washed out at this point.  You could almost argue that you're getting a discount on the half of the company that you prefer and the other half free. I don't know when that will change but I believe long term shareholders can find significant potential that should be rewarded with patience. Time is the friend of the great company.


Disclosure: At the time of this article I own $DRM.TO & $MPCT-UN.TO as well as indirect stakes in other entities mentioned in this article.
Not investment advice, please see (Can Do Investing: Ground Rules) page for more information.





Friday, April 28, 2023

The Ignored Stories of Linamar

The Ignored Stories of Linamar

Linamar... Li... Na... Mar. Believe it or not this doesn't stand for Lithium, Sodium, March. It is however intended to be broken up the way I just did. The late founder, Frank Hasenfratz, needed a name so he named it after Linda, Nancy & Margret. His two daughters and his wife. I always liked that story and found it especially warming when compared to the drama of the other large Canadian auto company.

Today's post isn't about names or fun facts no matter how much they may make the company more likable. I wanted to discuss the company in a bit more detail to my prior post. Often when $LNR.TO comes up in conversation, people are unenthusiastic. On the recent financial metrics, meandering stock price, or general attitude of meh towards the industry... it get brushed off as nothing special. I get it, there are a number of stocks that trade a low multiples and most casually seem like the next. Most of the time, the low multiple is suggesting overearning, lack of growth or some type of declining business. That may or may not be the case for each. The difference in my view with Linamar is that longer term this perception is off sides. I believe they are underearning their normal or potential and with that comes the potential future realization of the quality of the business. I view the special side of the company as something that starts coming out when you break down the sides and history of the business.


Main Businesses

Auto Parts

Originally, I was going to list all the components Linamar provided within their mobility segment. I'm not going to because there are too many. If you're interested I'll give you A Link To Their Product Page. Sufficed to say, they're quite diversified across products, manufacturing methods, customers, and future flexibility. Their manufacturing assets are able to shift what they're producing and thus able to easily handle flexible order sizes & shifts. They do a lot and have since 1966. Their precision manufacturing and expertise has expanded and is likely applicable to a growing suite of products inside and outside of the auto sector.

This flexibility has allowed them to easily add substantial EV business & even FCEV/ commercial Hydrogen prospects. I mention this because I often hear stuff like "but EVs will be a threat/difficulty." I don't expect that to be the case with whichever way and timeline that plays out.

As far as earnings and EBITDA goes, this segment is the biggest contributor. It is capex & D&A heavy but when done right can more often than not be a surprisingly decent business. Even excluding the D&A it's still the largest business line.

Skyjack

Skyjack is a line of products. Have you ever seen an orange lift device? (scissor, boom, telehandler cherry picker... they have lots of names and variants) Next time you do, check if it says Skyjack on it. Linamar makes those. They're certainly not commonplace in the office for most but in places where there's physical work being done above ground level (changing a window, fixing something on the second story, etc) such devises are common. Outdoor work and warehouses frequently use them. It's a niche market for sure & there are competitors. Linamar does make a solid product with a brand that people who work in the space will recognize. 

Linamar bought skyjack starting with a 48% stake in 2001. They bolstered the segment with another acquisition in 2007. It continued to grow globally and even now is expanding capacity into Mexico, Hungary and China. Some of which just started up in Q4 of 2022 and significantly expands capacity into 2023. Manufacturing will go from two plants in Canada to Five across three continents. A 235% increase in unit capacity.




Agriculture

The agricultural segment consists of two main acquired brands; Salford and MacDon. Aswell as some older ones such as Oros and Harvestec. Putting things in the ground and collecting them once they've grown. Both sides use giant machinery. Guess who makes all sorts of giant machinery... Both of these were acquired more recently, MacDon in 2018 and Salford last year. They spent a combined $1.46 Billion on the two. They paid roughly 10x EBITDA for MacDon & roughly 8x for Salford on a trailing, pre-synergy basis. I should point out that the ag cycle was in a different place a few years ago amidst a sustained period of low farmer capex. 

I believe the whole suite of agricultural offerings will add a different dimension of scale to the business. I'd suspect that growth from that sector would offer solid returns if they expand.



(My 5 year old brain loves the pictures of the things the company I own a small part of builds. Seeing real ones is 10x more satisfying.)

Going forward, I believe the EBITDA for the industrial segment (Ag + Lifts) could be in the realm of $400M (see math below & add D&A of ~56M). If a world existed where sums of the parts were valued on par with the parts, (~10x back then) one could imagine that Linamar's industrial assets values might not be fully reflected in their current ~$4B market cap.


The presentation from when they acquired Macdon This One (Linamar 2017 MacDon Acquisition) Has a slide with multiple sector multiples (Ag, Lift & Autos) demonstrates how the market might have viewed the value of the segments. Since the resolution when I put it here was terrible, I'll summarize that the non autos traded at 10x forward EBITDA (vs autos at 5x) another slide showed a current and pro forma EBITDA pie chart and details of the price they were paying for the value in MacDon.


The point is, it might be possible that the value, cashflow potential, quality, or whatever you want to go by, is lost within the company. Using rough math from the presentation above I could suggest $3B-$4B in value of industrial [Assuming 1.2B takes the segment from 15% to 25% (slide 17) then add capex, synergies & Salford]. If you prefer for simplicity, ~2x Sales. Yes, this is suggesting that the industrial segment provides a minority of the earnings. I think that can be looked at via multiple lenses.

Numbers

Looking at the guidance given at the Q4 earnings, let's look at what the 'Normalized' earnings would be.

Guidance for both segments was "Double digit sales growth" So let's assume 10%

Mobility Sales in 2022: $6004M                

2023 at ~10% Growth: $6600M

Mobility Normalized Margin: 7-10%

Operating Earnings at Midpoint (8.5%): $561M

                                             Depreciation and Amortization would add: ~$400M

Industrial Sales in 2022: $1913M               

2023 at ~10% Growth: $2100M

Industrial Normalized Margin: 14-18%

Operating Earnings at Midpoint (16%): $336M

                                             Depreciation and Amortization would add: ~$60M


That's a shade under $900M ($897M) of operating earnings on a normalized basis. Great... now what the heck is an operating earnings. It looks something like EBIT (Earnings Before Interest & Tax). It's far from a perfect measure given the existence of interest and tax but gives some idea of what the earnings power of the business can be beyond the significant factors of Depreciation and Amortization that are parts of this kind of business. It also demonstrates how much growth or acquisition capacity the company has. I am admittedly a bit of a D&A apologist. Yes depreciation is a real thing but it's really just deferred cashflow.


Earnings Sensitivity

An interesting aspect about perpetual 'low margin' businesses is that small changes in margins can make surprising differences for a time.

In 2015 easing commodity prices helped boost earnings.

Recently, inflationary cost pressures in wages, commodities etc have hurt margins.

Last year, Linamar bought a Georg Fischer & Linamar JV "Mills River" which is a foundry not yet operating at a profitable scale. This, and other facilities in the ramp phase can also suppress margins. Linamar has twice suggested that they have a plan to achieve profitability at Mills River in "12 to 18 Months" that sounds like a volume and margin improvement. The swing might be in the neighborhood of $60M (1%-1.5% margin hit was the numbers I've seen suggested)

On the topic of Volume... There are multiple ways for parts companies to grow business. Increased content per vehicle & obviously, more vehicles. This isn't always a 1:1 correlation with total auto sales because demand and inclusion across vehicle types varies.

Industrial segment prices reset in January. Hopefully that should result in a normalized (~500 bps) jump on the segment of roughly $2B in sales.

Linamar also suggested that China's Q1 rebound wasn't exactly expeditious so the margin rebound in autos would likely be delayed.

Supply Chain

You might have heard... there was this chip shortage thing. Basically, if a product is unfinished, it can't ship. This fact has hit Linamar on both sides. On their industrial segment the supply chain disruptions plagued them all year with a gradual bias towards easing. On the auto parts side they got hit on the unpredictable production schedule of their customers who'd stop and start production as they intermittently lacked something from somebody. That side hurts on volume and on costs (paying people with nothing to do). Supply chain disruptions and production schedule are some big unknows going forward. They seem to be improving but remain imperfect.

This is similar to inflation. Labor, energy, transport, and raw materials have been volatile and problematic recently. While it's improving, it's still not back to normal and particularly on labor costs, it remains problematic.

There are a lot of problems. That's what's reflected in the current underutilization of the assets and depressed earnings. I like buying fixable problems, especially when the market doesn't seem to be counting on them being fixed. I don't know what the new normal will be once they are but think there's a lot of reasons why it should look relevantly better. Stock price drives narrative and I believe there's significant room for narrative improvement to get to... and perhaps beyond a more reasonable level in this name too.

Balance Sheet & Deployable Capital

Linamar's last twelve months' EBITDA is roughly $1B. Now as much as growth, MR & price resets should help the company going forward I'm really only looking for rough numbers here. Net debt to EBITDA is roughly 0.5x. Their target leverage is 1.5x (historically it has spent stretches at 1.8 when a suitable acquisition was found).

For this trivial exercise I'll assume that tax is offset by growth. So they should roughly have between 0.5 & 2.5 times their EBITDA to deploy over the next year. That's $500M to $2.5B. I'd have a base case of $1B (to keep ND/EBITDA flat) but an ideal case of $2B (to achieve target leverage). 

"Yeah dude that's just business why are you making such a big deal out of it..." Well, I think it matters that the scale of this capital feels noteworthy relative to their market cap. $1B would be over $15/share. $2B would be over $30/share. Certainly some of this is offsetting depreciation. Does it seem relevant to you? By expanding the theoretical to taking it to 2x EBITDA and 2 years, you can come up with +$50/share. Again some is to offset depreciation & more is spending to accommodate growth in existing businesses... but that's real dough.

Basically, they can easily add a relevant asset/business/brand to the organization without issuing equity or taxing the balance sheet more than they wanted. That should add EBITDA, EPS and make the 'ROE' (which I often quote) look better.

The market had a violently negative reaction to learning that Linamar had some good places to invest capital. It was a bit confusing given that this has always been a capital heavy business.


Medical Devices

Linamar first contributed to the medical devices space when the economy shut down in 2020 and ventilators were in short supply. Within weeks they redirected efforts to fill that demand. It didn't make a dent in the capacity or profitability of the company but went to show how flexible they can be and how adept they are at building new products when the need arises. "Manufacturing is manufacturing" is what they said at the time. That wasn't the origin of their desire to enter the medical devices field. It was part of their Linamar 2100 strategy from a few years prior that looked at lasting fields that they wanted to enter for the long term. The agricultural expansion was also part of this. Anyways, they got ISO13485 certified. (Certification needed to produce medical devices) They also have a few medical products in the works. They hope to provide high quality, cost effective solutions for medical devices and precision medical components under their Linamar MedTech umbrella.

I'm not sure when it might be large enough to matter let alone be split in earnings. I do believe that growing in that direction will over time change the perception of the company.

"Auto parts, yuck who care, it's cyclical capital heavy, should have a low multiple" etc

"Ok, they have some industrial and agricultural capacity... at least that's a different type of cyclicality and should offset some sector specific risk"

"Well whatever happens in the economy, the company can have some resilience to make it though carried by their medical devices business."

In other words, If I told you an auto parts business was a good one, you wouldn't believe me. If I told you a brand name industrial and agricultural products business was a good one, you might believe me. If I told you a medical devices business was a good business, you would believe me. The thing is, all can be true, sometimes. Allowing them all to thrive when they can is something that, if you were looking for a long term shift in how the market may look at the company, might unlock the value from stability. Obviously we're a long way from this given that it's currently an irrelevant segment. The company will have half of their current market cap of deployable capital over the next 2-3 years however, so, you never know.

Also, check your biases.

Linamar 2100

Ok, no one here is probably going to be a shareholder of Linamar in 2100. You know who likely will? Blackrock ;) ... just kidding... A member of the Hasenfratz* family. Linda Hasenfratz, the daughter of the Founder is the current CEO. The family still owns 1/3 of the company. The company has Mr Hasenfratz's name all over it. The company thriving in 100 years is certainly a long term goal. While that may not matter for your investment horizon, if order to get there it needs to first thrive though your investment horizon.


Let's pretend we were looking for an aggressive bull case:

What if history rhymes... Well which history...

In the late 1990s Linamar was running at ~30% ROE and trading at 5-6x book in the booming economy.

In the pre-2008 more inflationary & commodity boom cycle Linamar was generating 15% ROEs and trading near 1.5x book. They peaked at ~2.1x book.

In the ensuing recovery it traded at 1.6-3x book while generating high teens to low 20s ROE.

So which past should we compare it to? I don't believe the booming economy of the late 90s is likely to repeat... the Canadian market, led by Nortel, was pretty expensive back then too. I mention it's existence only to suggest that the performance of the last cycle wasn't "Everything perfect, so good it will never be seen again." In cyclical markets, things can... get weird. Also, in each of the last three cycles the peak valuation was above 2x Book (6.6x... yikes 2.1x & 3.2x) In terms of peak cycle stretches, 2/3 cycles had three year peak ROE stretches above 20%. The other inflationary one had roughly 13%.

With that and today's book value we can have a lot of fun.

1 Estimate future book: Current book * (1 + (Peak ROE %))^3

2 Apply target multiple: Peak Multiple * Future Book

In my prior post I looked at a mean reversion towards 15% ROE but used book multiples between 1.5x and 1.7x. The goal was to be realistic and not overly aggressive. The problem is that there's also reflexivity in the situation. If they can get ROE to 20% instead of 15% I'd expect to see more of a multiple expansion. In either case, I was also looking for a true fair value (as again I view this as a stealthily good company that should do just fine as a long term hold from a decent entry point) rather than what I'm going to look at now for a 'if you were trying to measure a hopeful sell target.' 

So if we got a good environment for a while... eventually... we could see, (~80*1.2^3)*2.1= $290 (3x book would be $414 after three good years)... yeah I know it sounds ridiculous now. I can't even fathom it but if operations were running at 1997 levels & valuations, the price would have been +$500 today. Maybe I'm saying all this so I feel less crazy for suggesting that it is probably worth closer to $120 than $60 today. Things change over time. That's my point. It also may have permanently changed for the worse. Maybe they never recover operations and things keep declining instead. Maybe ROE goes to 3% and we move towards 0.3x book. Maybe poor capital allocation decisions are made or there are problems and the company loses money consistently. It's all possible, that's why I say that even though I can point to what I think will eventually happen but for me to be right, THINGS NEED TO CHANGE. WE NEED TO SEE IT. It's not because I view the stock as undervalued that the market should bid it to where I think it should be. As I suggested last time, I think the mid 100s is probably a reasonable fair value when things normalize... with growth from there.

Buyback

With my opinion on their intrinsic value part of me would prefer them using this discount to buyback more shares. Academically, if they normalized their leverage ratio to 1.5x by spending $1B buying back 1/4 of the company I believe it would add a ton of value per share. I'd love to increase my holdings by 33%. In practice it won't go that way. CEO own's too much, prices would move in the attempt, it's not exactly in their nature. That said, I will admit to some disappointment that the NCIB (buyback) wasn't renewed yet. Having the option on the table, even if only for exotic events or temporary dislocations, is something I think most companies should have on hand. I understand that they have a lot of capital to spend to fulfil their growth and they don't particularly want to expand the balance sheet only to buyback. Still, that would be my main input. Close enough to or above book, this desire fades unless they can't find anything worth buying/spending money on.

Last Decade & Next Decade

Over the last decade Linamar has; 

Taken their book value per share from ~$17 to ~$78

They've acquired: Mubea (2013) Seissenschmidt (2014) Montupet (2016) MacDon (2018) Salford (2022) Amid other JVs and deals.

I can't say whether the next decade will include more or less good years than the last. I realize, only after writing this how much there is going on that might be missed by calling this an auto parts company. I've been part of this problem. They can certainly make most of their money from that business. There's also tremendous value & resilience elsewhere. You also have a proven and aligned management team that has grown a tremendous amount of value by utilizing cashflows from business operations. I believe that will continue. In time, I suspect they'll show the market that it's both undervalued and underrated them at this juncture.

That's enough for today, hope you enjoyed.

Disclosure: At the time of this article I own $LNR.TO as well as have sold some puts so may be buying more later this year.
Not investment advice, please see (Can Do Investing: Ground Rules) page for more information.

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